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Involuntary guardianship of the person and property are devices
by which a court substitutes the judgment of a more capable person
for the judgment of an impaired individual. A guardian is one to whom
the law entrusts the custody and control of an impaired person, the
management of that person's property, or both.' Guardians of the
*Research Associate in Law, Center of Governmental Responsibility, College of Law, Uni-
versity of Florida. B.A., 1978; J.D., 1985, University of Florida.
1. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 744.102-.357 (1988). Every state has statutory procedures for
adjudication of incompetency and appointment of a guardianship. See ALA. CODE § 1-200 (1975
& Supp. 1987); ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.26.005-.320 (1988 & Supp. 1989), §§ 26-2A-1 to -160 (1986
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property are called curators2 or conservators; 3 the impaired person is
& Supp. 1988); §§ 13.26.095, .165 (1972); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-5301 to -5432, 36-547
to -547.09 (1986 & Supp. 1988); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 28-65-01 to -403 (1987 & Supp. 1988);
CAL. PROB. CODE § 1801 (1981 & Supp. 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-14-101 to -432 (1974);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 88 45-54 to -78 (1981 & Supp. 1988); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§
3914-3928 (1987); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 49-601 to -622 (1979 & Supp. 1987); HAw. REV. STAT.
§§ 560:5-101 to -430 (1985 & Supp. 1987); IDAHO CODE §§ 15-5-101 to -432 (1979 & Supp. 1988);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 , para. 11-3 to -6, la-1 to -23 (Smith-Hurd 1978 & Supp. 1987);
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 29-1-18-1 to -19-18 (Burns 1972 & Supp. 1988); IOWA CODE §§ 633.552-.682
(1964 & Supp. 1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-3001 to -3038 (1983 & Supp. 1988); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. §H 387.500 to 388.39 (Baldwin 1987); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 389 to 426 (West
1952 & Supp. 1988); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A §§ 3-601 to -721 (1981 & Supp. 1988);
ME. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. §§ 13-101 to -222 (1974 & Supp. 1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 201, §§ 6-13A to -48A (West 1981 & Supp. 1987); MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. §§
330.1600-:1642 (West 1980 & Supp. 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 525.54-.61 (West 1975 & Supp.
1989); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 93-13-121 to -219 (1972 & Supp. 1988); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 475.010-
.480 (Vernon 1956 & Supp. 1989); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 72-5-101 to -439 (1988); NEB. REV.
STAT. 88 30-2601 to -2661 (1985 & Supp. 1988); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 159.013-.215 (Michie
1986 & Supp. 1988); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 464-A:1 to 465:14 (1983 & Supp. 1988); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 3B:1-1 to :13A-31 (1983 & Supp. 1988); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-5-301 to -432
(1987 & Supp. 1988); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 78.01-.5 (McKinney 1979 & Supp. 1988);
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 34-1 to -18, 35A-1101 to -125 (1988); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 30.1-26-01 to
-29-32 (1976 & Supp. 1987); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2111.01-.48 (Anderson 1976 & Supp.
1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, §§ 1-116 to 4-804 (West 1976 & Supp. 1989); OR. REV. STAT.
88 126.003 .413 (1987); 20 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 5501, 5511-5525 (West Supp. 1988); R.I.
GEN. LAWS §§ 33-15-8 to -18-31 (1984 & Supp. 1988); S.C. CODE §§ 62-5-401 to -624 (1987 &
Supp. 1988); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 30 26-1 to -33-47 (1984 & Supp. 1987); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 34-1-101 to -7-105 (1984 & Supp. 1988); TEx. PROB. CODE tit. 5, §§ 108-127A,
130A-130(o) (West 1980 & Supp. 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-5-301 to -433 (1978 & Supp.
1988); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 3060-3081 (1974 & Supp. 1988); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 37.1.128.01
to .147 (1984 & Supp. 1988); WASH. STAT. §§ 11.88.010-.150, 11.92.010-.185 (West 1967
& Supp. 1988); W. VA. CODE §§ 27-11-1 to -6 (1986 & Supp. 1988); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§
880.01-.39, .60 (West 1966 & Supp. 1988); Wyo. STAT. § 3-1-101 to -6-119 (Michie 1977 &
Supp. 1988).
Federal legislation has been proposed. See H.R. 5266, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) (introduced
by Rep. Claude Pepper, Dem.-Fla.); H.R. 5275, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) (introduced by
Rep. Olympia Snowe, Rep.-Me.).
For somewhat outdated but thorough reviews of statutory provisions, see DEVELOPMENTAL
DISABILITIES STATE LEGISLATIVE PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMIS-
SION ON THE MENTALLY DISABLED, GUARDIANSHIP & CONSERVATORSHIP STATUTORY
SURVEY (1977); Alexander, Brubaker, Deutsch, Kovner & Levine, Surrogate Management
of the Property of the Aged, 21 SYRACUSE L. REV. 87 (1969).
2. See generally FLA. STAT. §§ 747.06-.19 (1987) (appointment and duties of curators).
3. In Florida, conservatorship refers only to guardianship of the property for individuals
rendered incapable due to absence from the state. See FLA STAT. §§ 747.01-.02 (1987).
The UNIFORM PROBATE CODE and many state statutes use the term "conservator" synonym-
ously with guardian of the property, as will this article. See U.P.C. §§ 5-103, -419 (1982); see,
e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-7A-1 (1975 & Supp. 1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525.539 (West 1975 &
Supp. 1988).
[Vol. 40
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a ward or conservatee.4 The appointment of a guardian follows an
adjudication of incompetencyAs
The purpose of a guardianship is to appoint a surrogate decision-
maker, with authority to control the ward's decisions, or to make
decisions the ward cannot make. A guardianship of the person, and
perhaps of the estate as well, is usually established to allow the guar-
dian to authorize medical treatment for which the patient is unwilling
or unable to give consent, or to change the ward's residence to one
where more or different assistance can be provided. 6 A court is likely
to appoint a guardian of the property when an incompetent individual
fails to use available resources to meet personal needs or needs of
dependents, when he or she appears likely to be victimized by others,
or when it appears the individual's use of the assets will in some other
way dissipate the estate.7 Relatives of the incompetent individual or
the state file nearly all guardianship petitions.s
Florida's guardianship statute has become tle focus of controversy.
The press has reported the misdiagnosis of nmental disorders, inaccu-
rate evidence, sloppy procedures, and guardians who neglect their
responsibilities without penalty. 9 Public opinioa supporting reform has
grown and new legislation is now being studied' and debated at national
and state levels. In September 1987, the House Select Committee on
4. See FLA. STAT. § 744.102(8) (1987) ("[A] 'ward' is an incompetent for whom a guardian
has been appointed."). The term "protected person" also has been used for an individual who
has a conservator. See U.P.C. §§ 5-103(18), (22) (1982).
5. Since 1973, Florida law requires appointment of a guardian following a declaration of
incompetency. FLA. STAT. § 744.331(9) (1987). The U.P.C. would leave the court freedom to
enter any other appropriate order. See U.P.C. § 5 306(B) (1982).
6. Frolik, Plenary Guardianship: An Analysis, a Critique and a Proposal for Reform, 23
ARIz. L. REv. 599, 625 (1981).
7. Id.
8. See Friedman & Savage, Taking Care: The Law of Conservatorship in California, 61
S. CAL. L. REv. 273, 280 (1988) (citing a study of guardianship actions in San Mateo County,
Cal., during 1982, 1984, and 1986). Demographic data on guardianship participants is scarce,
but practitioners' impressions suggest the San Mateo findings are typical of demographics in
many jurisdictions.
9. See Good & King, Wards of the Court, St. Petersburg Times, Dec. 14, 1986, at 1A, col.
1, Dec. 15, 1986, at IA, col.4, Dec. 16, 1986, at IA, col.3, Dec. 17, 1986, at 1A, col.2, Dec. 21,
1986, at IA, col.5; F. Bayles & S. McCartney, Associated Press, six part series released Sept.
20, 1987 (reprinted in part in the Tallahassee Democrat, Sept. 27, 1987, at 1B, and the Tampa
Tribune, Sept. 22, 1987, at IF) (on file); see also Final Report of the Grand Jury, Circuit Court
of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida in and for the County of Dade, Nov. 11, 1982
(documenting abuses within the guardianship system) (on file). For a discussion of neglect of
supervision of Florida guardianships, see New, A Proposal for a Guardianship Oversight Com-
mission in Florida, FLA. B.J., Feb. 1985, at 47.
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Aging, Subcommittee on Health held hearings on guardianship abuses,
and the 1988 Florida Legislature created a Guardianship Study Com-
mission. 0 This article will discuss involuntary guardianship, and recom-
mend changes in law and practice, paying particular attention to their
impact on elderly persons.
The law and practice of guardianship are significant to older persons
and their advocates because over 500,000 elderly persons are wards
of the court, and the number will increase." The population of individu-
als age eighty-five and older, who are most likely of all adults to need
guardian assistance, has a growth rate of 25 percent, compared to 5
percent for the under sixty population.' 2 In some jurisdictions, includ-
ing Pinellas County, Florida, 85 percent of wards of the court are
ages sixty-five and older.'8
The appointment of a substitute decisionmaker for an individual
impaired by old age is a particularly grievous loss to that individual,
and should be imposed with care. Elderly wards typically have led
active, autonomous adult lives in which they contributed to society
and accrued wealth for their own use and enjoyment. In this respect,
they differ from children and developmentally disabled persons, who
10. Fla. S. 431 (Reg. Sess. 1988, introduced by Comm. on Judiciary - Civil); Fla. H.R.
1343 (Reg. Sess. 1988, introduced by Rep. Liberti). Principal opposition to immediate reform
comes from the Real Property, Probate and Trust Law Section of The Florida Bar. See McDonald,
Position of the Guardianship Law Committee of the Real Property, Probate and Trust Law
Section of The Florida Bar on Guardianship Law Reform, REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE AND
TRUST LAW SECTION ACTION LINE NEWSLETTER, Nov.-Dec. 1987, at 15.
The conflict and compromise in development of guardianship reform in Florida follows the
pattern of other states. In California, sole opposition to reform proposals by the state bar Legal
Services Committee arose from the Probate and Trust Committee. See Alexander, Who Benefits
from Conservatorship?, in AGING IN AMERICA (pt. 4), TRIAL MAG., May 1977, at 32. In
Arkansas, passage of reform legislation in 1983 raised vehement objections from the probate
law section of the state bar. Implementation of the reform legislation was delayed until passage
of a compromise statute in 1985. See Brantley, Guardianship Reform: Five Years of Change,
ARK. LAW., July 1987, at 101-02. For description of the reform process in Minnesota, see In
re Mikulanec, 356 N.W.2d 683, 686-88 (Minn. 1984).
11. Pepper, Abuses in Guardianship of the Elderly and Infirm: A National Disgrace,
Sept. 25, 1987 (Claude Pepper, Chairman, Sub-Committee on Health and Long-Term Care,
House Select Committee on Aging) [hereinafter Abuses in Guardianship]. The number of guar-
dianship cases in Florida is unknown.
12. Fowles, The Numbers Game, AGING MAG., 1987, at 44. In 1986, there were 29.2 million
Americans, 12.1% of the population, age 65 or older. Id. On the need for guardians in Florida,
see Schmidt & Rogers, Legal Incompetents' Need for Guardians in Florida, 15 BULL. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY LAW 67 (1987).
13. Friedman & Savage, supra note 8, at 279; Good & King, supra note 9, at 16A, col.3.
[Vol. 40
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comprise most of the balance of disabled persons in the population. 14
Depriving an elderly person of independent choice by appointing a
surrogate decisionmaker curtails long-held rights and expectations.
The special circumstances of these citizens therefore warrant attention
as legislators consider new guardianship law.
Florida, like other states contemplating guardianship reform, must
decide whether to retain and amend its present statute and practices,
or to completely reform the law to correct existing abuses.15 In either
case, the state must weigh rights of the incompetent and interests of
society, and choose an appropriate theory and model of guardianship.
This article will discuss three basic aspects of guardianship that need
reform: the definition of incompetency, the appropriate scope of a
guardian's authority, and the level of procedural due process appropri-
ate to the creation and oversight of the guardianship.
II. IDENTIFYING THE WARD
Definitions of incompetency typically require two findings: a diag-
nosis of mental disorder or impairment, and descriptive proof of be-
havior or manifestations of that mental status.16 A diagnosis of mental
illness alone fails as a basis for a declaration of incompetency because,
without resulting behavior that requires compensation or control, the
guardianship serves no purpose.'7 Neither can behavior, without men-
14. A number of states have created separate provisions governing the legal incompetency
of minors. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 1501-1502 (West 1981) (California procedures for
incompetency of minors). On distinctions between legal incompetency of children and disabled
adults, see Katz, Elder Abuse, 18 J. FAM. L. 695, 716-20 (1979-80).
15. When traditional and reform guardianship models both are available, the reform model
rarely is used, so intended reforms are not realized.
16. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 744.102(5) (1987) ("An 'incompetent' is a person who, because
of minority, mental illness, mental retardation, senility, excessive use of drugs or alcohol, or
other physical or mental incapacity, is incapable of either managing his property or caring for
himself, or both.'); see also Note, The Disguised Oppression of Involuntary Guardianship:
Have the Elderly Freedom to Spend?, 73 YALE L.J. 676, 679 (1964) (proposing the following
synthesis of state statutory definitions: A mental incompetent is one "who, by reason of mental
illness, mental deficiency, mental infirmities of old age, or any other cause, is unable to manage
his own affairs or property or is likely to become the victim of designing persons.").
17. See Green, Proof of Mental Incompetenwy and the Unexpressed Major Premise, 53
YALE L.J. 271, 276-78 (1944) (observation of symptomatic conduct of an alleged incompetent is
the only way to prove mental disorder requiring supervision).
For civil commitments, courts require behavior with specific characteristics in addition to
diagnosis of mental status. See Donaldson v. O'Connor, 422 U.S. 563, 574-76 (1975) (initial
diagnosis of mental illness alone, without further rendering of treatment, found insufficient for
adjudication of incompetency in civil commitment, when patient is not dangerous and is capable
of surviving alone or with the help of friends or family); Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657, 658,
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tal disorder, support a finding of incompetence. 18 Every adult in pos-
session of a sound mind has the right to engage in foolish, risky, or
harmful behavior, whether or not that person fully appreciates the
risk involved. 19 The law does not restrict such behavior unless it is
negligent or criminal.
There has been some confusion in practice as to the two aspects
of proof of incompetency. Under traditional statutes, courts conducting
guardianship proceedings emphasize the diagnosis of mental disorder.
The court receives evidence regarding the respondent's ability to man-
age tasks necessary for daily living only incidentally; this evidence
consists of behavioral descriptions offered to support the diagnosis of
mental disorder.20 As a result, the court determines competency solely
on the status of mental illness. Such a determination ignores the re-
quirements for proof of incompetency in typical traditional statutes,
relying entirely upon the controversial art of psychiatric prediction. 21
The court's reliance on diagnosis of mental disorder is the inevitable
result of the composition of traditional examining committees, which
provide the principal evidence on the issue of competency. In Florida's
661 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (patient prone to wandering away and being exposed at night, but not
dangerous to self or others, is not a proper subject for indeterminate commitment); In re
Beverly, 342 So. 2d 481, 490 (Fla. 1977) (though evidence was sufficient to show patient was
mentally ill, behavior consisting of two violent occasions, quitting a job because of religious
beliefs, and having delusions of power from identification with God and Jesus Christ, was
insufficient to show civil commitment was necessary). Distinctions between civil commitment
and guardianship actions fail to suggest mental status should be sufficient for guardianships
only. See infra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
18. See 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 228 (Chitty ed. 1913) ('When a man on an
inquest of idiocy hath been returned an unthrift and not an idiot. . ., no farther proceedings
have been had.").
19. See Frolik, supra note 6, at 627.
20. See Statement of Recommended Judicial Practices, adopted by the Nat'l Conf. on the
Judiciary on Guardianship Proceedings for the Elderly, June 1986, at 23-24 [hereinafter Recom-
mended Judicial Practices].
Definitions of incompetency for which medical evidence alone may seem to be dispositive
consist of lists of specific disorders and far less specific resulting behaviors. See, e.g., FLA.
STAT. § 744.102(6) (1987) (definition of incapacitated person); WASH REV. CODE § 11.88.010(2)
(1967 & Supp. 1988) (an incapacitated person is one who "by reason of mental illness, develop-
mental disability, senility, habitual drunkenness, excessive use of drugs, or other mental incapac-
ity [is incapable of] either managing his property or caring for himself or both"); Wyo. STAT.
§§ 3-1-101(a)(vii, viii) (Michie 1977 & Supp. 1988) (an incompetent is one who is "unable unassisted
to properly manage and take care of himself or his property as a result of the infirmities of
advanced age, physical disability, disease, the use of alcohol or controlled substances... mental
illness, mental deficiency or mental retardation.").
21. See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
954 [Vol. 40
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typical traditional statute, the examining committee includes two
physicians and one layman,- but no professional with training in func-
tional assessment.2 Social, mental health, and community health work-
ers routinely conduct such assessments, which are inventories of daily
activities, that can provide the court with objective information about
the respondent's ability to manage independently or with voluntary
assistance. To provide the court with evidence on both aspects of
competency, examining committees should include an individual with
professional training in functional evaluation to examine every prospec-
tive ward.
In contrast with the emphasis on diagnosis found in traditional
statutes, reform statutes emphasize functional impairment over mental
disorder.2 This shift in emphasis results primarily from changes in
the definition of incompetency, rather than from the addition of func-
tional assessment evidence required by reform statutes.2 Florida's
22. FLA. STAT. § 744.331(5) (1987).
23. For a discussion of functional assessments, see Casananto, Saunders & Simon, Indi-
vidual Functional Assessment: A Guide to Determining the Need for Guardianship Under New
Hampshire Law, 28 N.H. B.J., Fall 1986, at 13.
24. See Mitchell, The Objects of Our Wisdom and Our Coercion: Involuntary Guardianship
for Incompetents, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 1405, 1431 (1979).
25. See Recommendations of the ABA National Symposium on Guardianship: A Response
to the Associated Press Inquiry (July 21-23, 1988) [hereinafter National Guardianship Symposium]
(as endorsed by ABA Health Law Delegates Feb. 7, 1989; monograph scheduled for publication
Summer 1989) (definitions of incapacity should focus on functional capacity) (copy on file)
[hereinafter National Guardianship Symposium].
See, e.g., Fla. S. 196 (Reg. Sess. 1988, introduced by S. Weinstein); Fla. H.R. 347 (Reg.
Sess. 1988, introduced by Rep. Tobin) ("An 'incapacitated' person means a person whose ability
to understand, evaluate, or respond to people, events and environments is limited to the extent
that he [or she] lacks the capacity to manage at least some of his [or her] financial resources
or meet at least some of the essential requirements for his [or her] physical health or safety.");
see also ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 , para. 11a-3 (1987) ("[A disabled person] lacks sufficient
understanding or capacity to make or communicate responsible decisions concerning the care of
his person, or ... is unable to manage his estate or financial affairs."); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 387.510(9)(10) (Baldwin 1987) (a 'mentally ill person" means a person with substantially
impaired capacity to use self-control, judgment, or discretion in the conduct of his affairs and
social relations, associated with maladaptive behavior or recognized emotional symptoms where
impaired capacity, maladaptive behavior, or emotional symptoms can be related to physiological,
psychological, or social factors); TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 130A(b) (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1989)
("[An incompetent is one who] because of a physical or mental condition is substantially unable
to feed, clothe, or shelter himself, to care for his own physical health, or to manage hiaproperty
or financial affairs [as evidenced by] recurring acts or occurrences within the preceding six
month period and not by isolated instances of negligence or bad judgment."); GUARDIANSHIP
AND CONSERVATORSHIP STATUTORY SURVEY AND MODEL STATUTE § 3(1) (Developmental
Disabilities State Legislative Project of the ABA Commission on Mentally Disabled, Model
HeinOnline  -- 40 U. Fla. L. Rev. 955 1988
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1988 reform proposals, for example, identify the appropriate ward as
"[a person whose] ability to understand, evaluate, or respond to people,
events, and environments is limited to the extent that he lacks the
capacity to manage at least some of his financial resources or to meet
at least some of the essential requirements for his physical health or
safety." Under this definition, a prospective ward's mental impair-
ment need be no more specific than a showing of limited ability.
Such a definition represents so broad a range of impairments that
it includes behavior that results from idiosyncratic choice rather than
from mental disorder. It may be acceptable to reform advocates who
are concerned primarily with helping developmentally disabled indi-
viduals whose limitations are not disputed. However, this definition
threatens to impose "better," i.e., more logical or more conventional
decisionmakers on sane, independent, elderly individuals. Thus, this
definition of the appropriate ward is unacceptable.
The definition of the appropriate incompetent or incapacitated27
ward requires both legs - mental impairment and behavioral limita-
tions - on which to stand. Proving this definition requires a functional
assessment, without which diagnosis of mental disorder is too uncertain
and too tenuous to link mental impairment and behavioral limitations
to harmful results. This link is necessary to justify curtailment of
individual autonomy. The individual's functional impairment must re-
sult from mental disorder, because behavioral assessment alone may
result in loss of autonomy for an individual who rationally chooses
socially disfavored behavior.
Ironically, traditional definitions of the appropriate ward include
both elements. Their phrasing has been so long-abused, however, that
they may inadequately convey the two-part concept. To revitalize the
Statute 1979) [hereinafter ABA MODEL STATUTE] ("Tartially disabled persons means adults
whose ability to receive and evaluate information effectively and/or communicate decisions is
impaired to the extent that they lack the capacity to manage at least some of their financial
resources andor meet at least some of the essential requirements for their physical health or
safety without court-ordered assistance or appointment of a limited personal guardian or limited
conservator.").
26. Fla. S. 196, § 744.102(12) (Reg. Sess. 1988, introduced by S. Weinstein); see Frolik,
supra note 6, at 604-05 (opposing use of "incapacitated" concept in reform statutes as merely
a judgment about the quality of the impaired person's decisions, irrelevant to justify appointment
of a guardian).
27. Traditional statutes use the term 'incompetent" to describe the ward's legal status.
Reform statutes, in keeping with the concept of limited guardianship, use the term 'incapaci-
tated." See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 744 (1987).
[Vol 40
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definition of incompetency requires both a restatement of the defini-
tion2 and the addition of functional evaluation to the examining com-
mittee report.
A. Mental Impairment
Mental disorders are particularly difficult to describe and to limit
in the legal proceedings of incompetency.2 Mental illness usually can-
not be identified with the level of certainty similar to diagnosis of
physical illness, nor can its identifying characteristics be catalogued
or the disease course predicted with similar assurance. 30 Statutes list
some useful categories such as alcoholism and drug addiction as con-
ditions of mental impairment31 However, two common diagnoses with
particular impact on the elderly deserve critical attention: senility and
physical impairment.
1. Senility
Senility, as a legal concept, is found in Florida's and in many
traditional and reform statutes. Synonymous terms in other statutes
include "old age" and "advanced age." In the past, a single term
such as senility could more easily serve to describe a variety of related
symptoms of chronic, degenerative memory loss and disorientation.
28. One possible definition, specifying both mental disorders and behaviors, which in com-
bination indicate need for a guardian, is as follows: An incompetent or incapacitated person is
one who, because of mental illness, developmental disability, addiction to drugs or alcohol, or
other mental disorder, is incapable of understanding and evaluating information to make or
communicate decisions necessary in order independently to secure food, clothing, shelter, or
medical care, or to manage property or financial affairs. Such incapacity (or incompetency) shall
be shown by recurring acts or occurrences within the preceding six month period, and not by
isolated instances of negligence or bad judgment, or by refusal of medical care alone.
29. Mental disorder and behavior or symptoms are inevitably bound together in some
circular reasoning. That is, erratic or unacceptable behavior indicates some mental illness,
diagnosis of which serves as a tool for interpretation of other instances of questionable behavior.
See Note, supra note 16, at 687 (property mismanagement tends to reinforce and itself becomes
evidence of mental weakness).
30. See Leifer, The Competency of the Psychiatrist to Assist in the Determination of Incom-
petency: A Sceptical [sic] Inquiry into the Courtroom Functions of Psychiatrists, 14 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 564, 570 (1984); see also Green, supra note 17, at 275 (insanity is not an operative
legal fact).
31. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 744.102(5) (1987) (defining "incompetent").
32. Id. § 744.102(5). The infirmities of aging are defined as organic brain damage and
advanced age. Id. § 415.102(3).
33. Thirty-three states include advanced age as cause for determining incompetence. See
A&uses in Guardianship, supra note 11.
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This was so because deterioration in old age was poorly understood
and rarely treated in the course of a short decline before death.
Today, gerontological and geriatric studies have identified numerous
causes of such symptoms, many of which can be improved or cor-
rected.H "Senility" has now become a term indicating ignorance of the
conditions causing impairment.
The use of such terms is inappropriate as a basis to appoint a
permanent surrogate decisionmaker. Especially objectionable is the
extent to which these terms perpetuate the prejudice that mental
weakness is likely in old age. 6 The presence of such bias greatly
reduces the accuracy of competency determination because it distorts
psychiatric diagnosis and prediction.37 Therefore, the terms "senility,"
"old age," and "advanced age" have no place in guardianship statutes.
2. Physical Impairment
Many statutes include 'physical impairment" as another basis to
appoint a guardian. Persistent use of this term is somewhat mystifying,
because guardianship theoretically requires some degree of mental
impairment.3 Presumably, a physically impaired but mentally capable
individual needs an agent, not a guardian, to affect decisions. A patient
who wants assistance in making decisions can voluntarily authorize a
guardian or other surrogate decisionmaker.39 No apparent basis exists
in the legal theories of incompetency and guardianship for including
physical impairment as a reason for guardianship.
The use of the term '"physical impairment" might persist because
some wards lack specific mental disorders that can be diagnosed by
mental status tests normally used by examining committees. 40 For
example, examining committees cannot categorize mental impairment
suffered by an extremely physically impaired person, who is perhaps
34. See STAFF OF THE SENATE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AGING, 95TH CONG., 1ST SESS.,
WORKING PAPER ON PROTECTIVE SERVICES FOR THE ELDERLY 7 (Comm. Print 1977)
[hereinafter WORKING PAPER].
35. See Krauskopf, The Elderly Person: When Protection Becomes Abuse, TRIAL MAG.,
Dec. 1983, at 64.
36. See Regan, Protective Services for the Elderly: Commitment, Guardianship, and Alter-
natives, 13 WM. & MARY L. REV. 569, 573 (1972).
37. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (the unreliability of psychiatric prediction).
38. See Note, supra note 16, at 680, nn.27-28.
39. See FLA. STAT. § 744.341 (1987) (voluntary guardianship); id. § 709.08 (durable family
power of attorney).
40. A mental status test includes assessment of orientation to reality, memory function,
and reasoning ability. See Leifer, supra note 30, at 566-68.
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comatose or delirious from pain, disease or trauma. Similarly, examin-
ing committees cannot diagnose the individual who is entirely unable
to communicate. These are the most difficult circumstances in which
to determine an individual's competency, because only easily misinter-
preted actions can reveal the patient's preferences and the nature and
severity of any mental impairment.
The appointment of a guardian in such circumstances need not,
however, be based on the individual's physical impairments or on the
physical inability to communicate. Though the mental impairment may
not be categorized with other forms of mental illness, the court logically
can infer that mental impairment exists. This inference is based on
the individual's inability to participate in decisionmaking by forming
preferences because the individual is concentrating on the physical
disorder.
Extreme conditions of limited awareness or communication are not
the only circumstances in which a court will appoint a guardian for
the physically disabled. Courts frequently create such guardianships
for elderly persons when communication or concentration is poor in
order to promote efficiency in care and property management. Some-
times, the difficulty in communication lies not with the ward's mental
capability but with the ward's location in a nursing home, isolated
from information about his or her property.
One might consider such a guardianship to be a form of benevolent
assistance, relieving the ward of burdensome decisions while maintain-
ing property and care. However, this view represents only half the
significance of guardianship for a cognizant individual. Guardianship
also deprives the patient of the rights to self-determination enjoyed
by all adults. 41 A declaration of incompetence seems particularly unfair
because the patient's right to have opinions treated with ordinary
regard and to have reasonable preferences carried out is the only area
of autonomy remaining in a physically impaired person. Loss of rights
to self-determination can be so traumatic that, on learning of a guar-
dianship, wards have deteriorated rapidly and died. 2
Though formal studies are lacking, there is evidence that a court
is far more likely to declare a physically impaired elderly person incom-
41. See Gelfand, Authority and Autonomy: The State, the Individual and the Family, 33
U. MiAMi L. REV. 125, 144-50 (1978) (discusses the allocation of power to the individual, family,
and state); see also infra notes 73-79 (balancing an individual's rights to autonomy and privacy
against the state's right to preserve life).
42. Nolan, Functional Evaluation of the Elderly in Guardianship Proceedings, LAW, MED.,
& HEALTH CARE, Oct. 1984, at 210, 217 n.19.
959
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petent than a similarly impaired young person.4 Certainly, exception
to the severe deprivation of rights involved in guardianship has been
raised on behalf of young wards. For example, courts applied limited
guardianship statutes initially, and sometimes exclusively, to youthful
developmentally disabled persons.44 Constitutional challenges to the
guardianship statutes have primarily been brought on behalf of young
physically disabled and retarded wards, presumably because of the
higher chances of success. 45 For younger persons, the opportunity to
perform all possible normal functions is considered therapeutic, 46 but
society places a lower value on self-determination for the elderly.
Therefore, efficient property management must often outweigh the
elder's autonomy. The imbalance of values is aggravated by the fact
that an elder has accumulated a substantial estate more often than a
young person. The unequal treatment represents the dominance of
the petitioners' interests over elderly respondents' interests.
The term "physical impairment" is not needed in guardianship stat-
utes to provide guardianship assistance to physically impaired individu-
als whose concentration and communications are so severely limited
that the court can make the necessary inference of mental limitation.
Other physically disabled persons are not appropriate wards, because
their limitations call merely for agents to assist in effecting their
decisions, rather than for substitute decisionmakers. Because society
undervalues the autonomy and rehabilitation of the physically impaired
elderly, the elderly are at a greater risk of being declared incompetent
than are younger people. Therefore the term, "physical impairment,"
creates inequality in application of the law. Legislators should elimi-
nate both "physical impairment" and "senility" from guardianship stat-
utes.
43. See Note, supra note 16, at 677 (unequal treatment of elderly); id. at 681 (hopes of
recovery limit court restraints on youthful respondents).
44. See, e.g., TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 130A (Vernon 1983) (providing limited guardianship
only for mentally retarded persons under Texas law). Florida's reforms were developed primarily
by the Disability Law Committee of The Florida Bar.
45. See, e.g., Katz v. Superior Court, 73 Cal. App. 3d 952, 141 Cal. Rptr. 234 (1977) (the
Moonie cases, in which parents' petitions for guardianship of their adult children in order to
effect "deprogramming," were rejected by the court on appeal on constitutional grounds). How-
ever, even challenges by youthful petitioners are not assured of success. See generally Dicker,
Guardianship: Overcoming the Last Hurdle to Civil Rights for the Mentally Disabled, 4 U.
AR. LrITLE ROCK L.J. 485, 497-505 (due process challenges to guardianship statutes in state
and federal courts). Constitutional challenges have been cut off by federal abstention, even when
the only state proceeding was the court's continuing jurisdiction over the guardianship. See
Mitchell, supra note 24, at 1428-30.
46. See Jost, The Illinois Guardianship for Disabled Adults Legislation of 1978 and 1979:
Protecting the Disabled from Their Zealous Protectors, 56 CHI.[-JKENT L. REV. 1087, 1098
(1980) (citing S. BRAHEL & R. ROCK, MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 26 (1971)).
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B. Functional Impairment
The incompetent individual must be unable to function in one or
both of two broad categories of behavior: property management and
self-care. 47 Minimum standards for competent behavior have not
emerged from the variety of circumstances found in case law, and are
not included in either traditional or reform statutes. Instead, courts
judge the quality of the respondent's conduct on an ad hoc basis,
assessing the likelihood of undesirable results and imposing a guardian
to correct or prevent their occurrence. For elderly respondents, two
such results deserve critical attention: dissipation of the estate and
self-neglect.
1. Dissipation of the Estate
Cases that limit a ward from spending or dissipating personal prop-
erty are variants of the "spendthrift" provisions found in some guar-
dianship statutes, which authorize the appointment of a guardian for
gamblers or alcoholics.4 Such a limitation on the owner's right to
control personal property represents a judgment of the unworthiness
of the intended expenditure and supports the interests that favor
preserving the assets.49 For example, in the case of the gambler, the
47. See FLA STAT. § 744.102(5) (1987); Note, supra note 16, at 680-81.
48. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 1801(b) (West 1987) ("A conservator of the estate may
be appointed for a person who is substantially unable to manage his or her own financial resources
or resist fraud or undue influence."); GA. CODE ANN. § 29-5-1 (Harrison 1985 & Supp. 1988)
("[A guardian of the property may be appointed] either because the property will be wasted or
dissipated unless proper management is provided or because the property is needed for the
support, care, or well being of [the ward] or those entitled to be supported by [the ward].");
ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 110 1, para. 11A-2(c) (Smith-Hurd 1987) ('[A guardian may be appointed
if an individual] because of gambling, idleness, debauchery or excessive use of intoxicants or
drugs, so spends or wastes his estate as to expose himself or his family to want or suffering.");
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 186-201C, § 8 (West Supp. 1987) ("A person who, by excessive
drinking, gaming, idleness, or debauchery of any kind, so spends, wastes or lessens his estate
as to expose himself or his family to want or suffering, or causes the department of public
welfare to charge or expense for his support or for the support of his family, may be adjudged
a spendthrift. The department of public welfare or a relative of the alleged spendthrift may file
a petition in the probate court, stating the facts and circumstances of the case and proving that
a guardian be appointed. If after notice as provided in the following section, and after a hearing,
the court finds that he is a spendthrift, it shall appoint a guardian of his person and estate.");
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525.54(3) (West Supp. 1988) ("Appointment of a guardian or conservator
may be made in relation to the estate and financial affairs of an adult person... (b) involuntarily,
upon the court's determination that . . .(2) the person has property which will be dissipated
unless proper management is provided, or that funds are needed for the support, care, and
welfare of the person or those entitled to be supported by the person.").
49. See Note, supra note 16, at 683-84, nn.30-45.
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statute limits the amount the ward can spend on this disfavored activ-
ity and protects the financial security of the ward's dependents. It
also protects the state's interests by helping to insure the ward and
dependents will not become impoverished and rely on the state for
support.
The court frequently finds dissipation of the estate when an elderly
prospective ward has a new companion of the opposite sex.50 The
relationship often involves costs to the estate for gift-giving and
perhaps travel or building a house.51 The petitioners are the heirs,
who seek to choose the guardian for their elderly relative. The appoint-
ment of a guardian limits the ward's spending and associations, re-
moves the right to marry, and may prevent the ward from writing a
new will.
This fact pattern differs distinctly from the pattern of the gambler.
The elderly person has no dependents to make a legal claim on the
assets. The behavior, consisting of a sexual or perhaps companionable
relationship, poses no apparent threat to orderly society. There is no
clear indication the elderly person will become destitute and burden
society with the cost of personal care. The only threat is to the probable
heirs' hopes of inheriting the estate.
The consistent support in case law for the interest of the proposed
ward's prospective heirs suggests that society would like to support
such claims . 2 Some statutes specifically identify this common fact pat-
tern as "vulnerability to designing persons." 53 Some states have in-
50. See, e.g., In re Josiah Oakes, 8 Law Rptr. 122, 124-25 (Mass. 1845) (respondent widower
could be restrained by the appointment of a guardian, for the safety of himself and others,
when he became engaged); see also Note, supra note 16, at 677-78 (guardianship following
respondents gift to widowed friend). Disapproval of personal, adult relationships for elderly
persons also appears in other probate cases. See Hoffman v. Kohns, 385 So. 2d 1064 (Fla. 2d
D.C.A. 1980) (invalidation of will executed one day after testator married his housekeeper).
51. See Note, supra note 16, at 682, nn.35-37 (propensity of elderly to spend assets).
52. The courts have been less likely to create a guardianship of the property if the petitioner
is a distant relative or if the new partner is of an age and financial position to be a socially
acceptable partner for the proposed ward. See Note, supra note 16, at 677 n.29.
53. See Alexander, On Being Imposed Upon by Artful and Designing Persons: The Califor-
nia Experience with the Involuntary Placement of the Aged, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1083
(1977); Alexander, supra note 10, at 30 (observing that vulnerability to "artful and designing
persons" bases incompetency on behavior of persons other than the prospective ward, which is
unacceptable to the petitioner). This description of dissipation was struck in 1977 as unconstitu-
tionally vague, at least as applied to ideas rather than property. See Friedman & Savage, supra
note 8, at 275; Mitchell, supra note 24, at 1405-07 (describing challenge to statute in "Moonie"
deprogramming cases). The phrase, however, has been replaced by "substantially unable to
resist fraud or undue influence," which may in practice be difficult to distinguish from the
unconstitutional language. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1801(b) (West Supp. 1987).
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voluntary conservatorship statutes authorizing appointment of a guar-
dian for the vulnerable individual without any adjudication of incompe-
tency.
However, no legal right now arises from an expectation of inheri-
tance. If such a right is to have effect, the court should weigh and
carefully balance the nature of any competing interests,5 including
property interests.5 Claims might arise because the elderly person
has maintained grown children in a given lifestyle. Likewise, claims
might arise from expectations based either on express promises or on
general expectations as to the prospective ward's natural heirs, which
produced behavior in reliance on the implied promise. Such claims
might be strengthened if the assets were inherited family wealth,
rather than the product of the elderly person's endeavors.
The court's findings should balance these claims for property control
against the strong presumption that an owner can dispose of unencum-
54. Several states first adopted involuntary conservatorship statutes in the 1890s, allowing
appointment of a guardian of the property without adjudication of incompetency. See Rohan,
Caring for Persons Under a Disability: A Critique of the Role of the Conservator and the
"Substitution of Judgment Doctrine," 52 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1977-78). Surrogate property
management without adjudication of incompetency has not been generally accepted, however.
In some states, all conservatorships are voluntary. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-67-103
(1987); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 464-A:13 (1985). Some states, including Florida, have considered
voluntary and involuntary guardianships sufficient, omitting involuntary property management.
But see Proposal of the Real Property, Probate and Trust Law Section, The Florida Bar
(unpublished) (on file).
A number of states adopted involuntary conservatorship when adopting the U.P.C. See, e.g.,
ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.315 (Supp. 1989); ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-5401 to -5432 (1986);
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-14-401 to -432 (1973 & Supp. 1976); IDAHO CODE §§ 15-5-401 to -432
(1979 & Supp. 1988); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 91A-5-401 to -431 (1979); NEB. REV. STAT. §§
30-2630 to -2661 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 32A-5-401 to -432 (1978); N.D. CENT. CODE §§
30.1-29-01 to -32 (1976); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-5-401 to 433 (1977).
55. See Rohan, supra note 53, at 9. Courts now generally appoint family members as
conservators, considering it likely that relatives have the greatest interest in the ward's well-
being. See In re Pfleghar, 31 Misc. 2d 244, 246, 62 N.Y.S.2d 899, 901 (Sup. Ct. 1946) (presumption
against reliability of relatives evolves into presumption in their favor).
However, when adverse interests are recognized, the court may refuse such an appointment.
See, e.g., In re Estate of Gorman, 77 Misc. 2d 564, 354 N.Y.S.2d 578 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974) (son
denied conservator status in circumstances in which any expenditure depleted estate).
56. Note, supra note 16, at 689. The ward usually is considered to have no interests
conflicting with any other individual or with society. Therefore, though guardianship has always
been considered as being for the ward's benefit, old statutes and practices frankly function to
protect beneficiaries and creditors. See, e.g., 1823 Ill. Laws § 1 (cited in Jost, supra note 46,
at 1089 n.9) (any creditor or relation a preferred petitioner); see also FINAL REPORT, PROTEC-
TIVE SERVICES FOR OLDER PEOPLE, FINDINGS FROM THE BENJAMIN ROSE INSTITUTE
STUDY 155-57 (1974) (on file).
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bered property according to personal inclination. It is unlikely the
beneficiaries' interest would ever completely negate the elderly per-
son's rights to spend the accumulated assets, as a guardianship of the
property usually negates all such rights. A guardianship created for
such circumstances would necessarily divide the power to spend be-
tween the preferences of the ward and the prospective heirs. The
resulting division of spending authority more closely resembles a con-
tractual agreement than the fiduciary relationship of guardianship.
Therefore, one must wonder whether a competency proceeding is the
appropriate form of action. By balancing these interests, courts would
likely discourage eager prospective heirs from misusing guardianship
to conserve the property of elderly relatives, while appropriate family
guardianships would hardly be affected. Thus, when the fact pattern
suggests the possibility of conflicting interests in property, the court
should apply the balancing of interests.
One Florida court already has indicated an appropriate balance
between the natural heir's interest in conservation and the elder's
conflicting interest in spending. In Bergman v. Serns, 7 the court
refused the guardian's petition to transfer the elderly ward, the guar-
dian's mother, to a nursing home so long as the estate was sufficient
to pay for home care. 5 The court found the incompetent elder's interest
in remaining at home, expressed only by choices made while compe-
tent, sufficient to justify expenditure of the substantially larger sum
needed for her twenty-four hour home care.59 The court favored the
emotional security of the home and inferred the ward would choose
to remain there, even though she could not articulate such values at
the time of the litigation.60 The court indicated that the presumptive
right to live in one's own home rather than in an institution, developed
in civil commitment cases, was even more fittingly applied in guardian-
ships in which institutionalization accomplishes no particular treatment
goals.61 These two values, home and autonomy, are the basis of
guidelines to be developed in the case law to balance the interests of
wards with those who would conserve the estate.
57. 443 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1983).
58. Id. at 133.
59. Id. at 132.
60. Id. at 133; see also Rosendorf v. Toomey, 349 A.2d 694 (D.C. 1975). In Rosendorf, the
court held that because the conservator's obligation is to conserve the estate for the use of the
conservatee and not to maximize it for potential heirs, the children of the disabled person may
not challenge expenditures for the ward's living expenses as excessive. Id. at 699-701.
61. Bergman, 443 So. 2d at 133.
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The values articulated in Bergman should also be incorporated into
Florida's guardianship statute. Though the more formal proceedings
of civil commitment normally precede placement in a mental hospital,6
elderly wards receive little benefit because nursing homes to which
they are usually removed are not considered to be institutions in this
context.6 Recognizing the potential conflict of interest between guar-
dian and ward over institutionalization as well as the sweeping power
granted the guardian, judges in many Florida jurisdictions routinely
require guardians to petition for court orders for nursing home place-
mentA4 Like other states that have standardized their supervision of
guardianships through statutory law, Florida should require approval
for nursing home placement of any ward.6
2. Self-Neglect
The second type of behavior indicating incompetency is failure to
care for oneself. Case law has not clearly defined behavior indicating
self-neglect, possibly because variations in prospective wards'
economic limitations and lifestyles make it difficult for courts to ques-
tion the petitioner's assertions that some behavior indicates self-ne-
glect amounting to incompetence. When considering whether self-ne-
glectful behavior indicates incompetence, courts have considered
whether the prospective ward used to live more conventionally or
more safely, rather than applying a minimum level of safe, responsible
behavior. 6 Thus, the prospective ward's preference for a new standard
of living becomes part of the evidence favoring guardianship.
As with dissipation of the property, the court's ad hoc decisionmak-
ing represents an inarticulate balancing of interests between the pros-
pective ward and the petitioner, who in self-neglect cases is, or rep-
resents, the prospective ward's care-giver. The prospective ward typ-
62. Current Florida law states the guardian shall honor the ward's reasonable preferences
as to place of residence, as expressed or demonstrated by the ward either prior to determination
of incompetency or as currently expressed. FLA. STAT. § 744.361 (1987). However, neither
FLA. STAT. § 744.441 (powers of the guardian on court approval) nor id. § 744.444 (powers of
the guardian without court approval) includes the power to institutionalize the ward. Id. §§
744.441, .444.
63. See Jost, supra note 46, at 1090 (the first and sometimes only act of the guardian is
to place the elderly ward in a nursing home).
64. Interview with Frank Repensek, Executive Director, Guardianship of Dade, in Miami,
Fla. (Jan. 11, 1988).
65. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 , parm. lla-14.1 (1987) (residential placement
prohibited without court order); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5536 (Purdon Supp. 1988).
66. See Note, supra note 16, at 677.
965
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ically has chosen to adapt his or her lifestyle to accommodate a growing
impairment, accepting a lower quality of life through isolation, poor
mobility in the home, and lack of transportation in order to maintain
independence. The care-giver, whether a family member or a state
social services program, has compensated for substantial areas of lost
capability by providing meals, homemaker assistance, home health-
aide care, financial management, companionship, and emotional sup-
port. The financial and emotional costs of maintaining the prospective
ward in the community are an increasing burden on the care-giver,
who asserts by petitioning the court for guardianship that the prospec-
tive ward's quality of life has deteriorated to an unacceptable level.
The petitioner has determined the need to reduce service costs and
emotional burdens outweighs the prospective ward's right to personal
choice of lifestyle. The petitioner intends to reduce costs and restore
a sense of order by placing the client in an institution on the grounds
of self-neglect.6
Florida's courts have already considered a balancing of these in-
terests to define the type and severity of self-neglect sufficient to
warrant judicial intervention. In cases construing Florida's Adult Pro-
tective Services Act,68 the statutory authorization for temporary
emergency guardianship, the Florida Supreme Court stated that self-
neglect consists of behavior producing a substantial risk of life-
threatening physical harm because of lack of necessary treatment,
care, sustenance, clothing, shelter, supervision, or medical services
essential to physical or psychological well-being.69 The court defined
substantial harm as immediate and severe. 70 The court considered only
the state's right to preserve life sufficient to balance the individual's
right to self-determination and privacy.71
No similar definition of self-neglect has been accepted as the stand-
ard for guardianship cases, though the impact on the ward far outlasts
the five day limitation of Adult Protective Services intervention.'7 The
67. Observations based on the author's personal experience during four years as social
services administrator in Florida community-based care for those elderly at risk of institutionali-
zation.
68. See In re Byrne, 402 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 1981).
69. Id. at 385-86.
70. Id. at 385. Limited guardianship statutes may specify the harmful behavior also must
be recurring and recent. See, e.g., TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. art. 5 (Vernon 1987).
71. Byrne, 402 So. 2d at 385. One environment the court found sufficiently unhealthy as
to threaten life provided no plumbing and dangling wiring, in which the respondents were naked
and surrounded by debris and excrement. Id. at 383, 386. One resident had fallen to the floor
and was unable to rise even with the other's assistance. Id. at 383.
72. FLA. STAT. § 415.105(3)(d) (1987).
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unstated distinction between Adult Protective Services and guardian-
ship seems to be the participation of the state in the former. The law
recognizes that the state's interest in efficient and effective benevolent
care directly conflicts with the individual's right to self-determination.
However, the state's interest in managing its social service resources
benefits other service recipients by protecting their legitimate claims.
These service recipients are protected because several of these indi-
viduals can live independently on fractions of the total services needed
to maintain one severely impaired individual; thus, the pool of re-
sources is not depleted.
The family guardianship petitioner has interests similar to the
state's in resource preservation and quality of life. The resources
needed for the elder's care might serve other purposes that benefit
several or all family members. Each wants to provide the type of care
that satisfies the caregiver's determination of good quality, while pru-
dently protecting the resources.
The state agency might have fewer conflicting interests than the
family petitioner because it does not primarily seek control of the
prospective ward's resources, but rather a budget of taxpayers' money.
The family petitioner's decisions are more likely to be affected by the
promise of benefit from conservation of the prospective ward's estate.
Both need restraint and supervision by the courts. The standards
articulated by the Adult Protective Services Act cases should be
adopted for all guardianship actions.
C. Summary
In guardianship or conservatorship proceedings, the petitioner
must prove both parts of a definition of incompetency: mental impair-
ment and resulting harmful behavior. Neither one alone is sufficient
basis for a determination of incompetency or imposition of a substitute
decisionmaker. The courts must limit and objectively define each term
to apply them equitably to all prospective wards of all ages and types
of impairment. Only behavior that poses an immediate and severe
threat to life should interfere with an individual's right to self-deter-
mination. Courts should recognize petitioners' concerns with the man-
agement of the prospective ward's assets or objections to non-harmful
eccentricities as conflicting with the prospective ward's rights to self-
determination. Additionally, courts should consider and protect any
legally recognized interest held by a petitioner or beneficiary. For
self-neglect to be the basis of a guardianship, the court should be
required to find that the behavior poses an imminent and serious risk
of harm to the respondent. Prospective wards who are not incompetent
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should under no circumstances be burdened with guardians or conser-
vators; it is their right to be left alone.7
III. SCOPE OF THE GUARDIAN'S AUTHORITY
A. The Least Restrictive Alternative
The scope of a guardian's authority is measured not only by poten-
tial services but by the ward's loss of fundamental liberty interests
as a result of that authority. Every ward endures the stigma of being
declared mentally incompetent. 74 Guardianship intrudes on or removes
the individual's fundamental right to privacy in personal decisionmak-
ing,7 while involuntary mental examinations invade private thoughts
and beliefs. 6 A ward may lose the right to choose where to live, and
who will be available for companionship and assistance. Other con-
stitutional rights that guardianship may take from the ward include
the right to wander at will,7 and to gather in public places for social
or political purposes. 79
Even when the court establishes only a guardianship of the prop-
erty, and personal decisionmaking powers are not legally removed,80
the impact on the individual is severe. The conservator can control
the ward's choices of lifestyle and associations by economic restraints.sl
73. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
74. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (an
individual has a constitutionally protected interest in not being declared mentally ill because
such adjudication affects reputation, right to contract and engage in orderly pursuits of free
persons, and rights to individual liberty).
In effect, proponents of conservatorship without adjudication of incompetency and of limited
guardianship for the largest possible pool of mildly impaired individuals each assert the stigma
is lessened by the form of guardianship they propose. When deprivation of autonomy remains,
this result seems unlikely in a society that places a high value on individual liberty.
75. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (discussing the right, in conjunction
with a freely chosen physician, to decide on proper treatment); WORKING PAPER, supra note
34, at 39, 47.
76. See Wilkinson & White, Constitutional Protection for Personal Lifestyles, 62 CORNELL
L. REV. 563 (1977) (privacy of beliefs).
77. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 220 (1944); see also Union Pac. Ry. v.
Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (the right to one's person may be said to be a right of
complete immunity: the right to be let alone).
78. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 163-64 (1972).
79. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615 (1971).
80. A ward found incapable of managing property cannot make "any gift, contract, or
instrument in writing that is binding on him or his estate." FLA. STAT. § 744.331(8) (1987).
This does not represent a limitation on voting and exercise of other civil rights.
81. See WORKING PAPER, supra note 34, at 40 (guardianship of person and property are
in practice virtually indistinguishable). However, one commentator disingenuously writes in
favor of U.P.C. model conservatorship: "Seldom will there be a need to appoint a guardian for
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Though the conservatee retains the legal right to petition the court
if the conservator refuses reasonable wishes, this may be beyond the
capacity of an impaired individual and legal assistance may be unavail-
able.- Conservatorship statutes that provide for transfer of property
management powers without a declaration of incompetency make only
a semantic distinction. When actual autonomy is so restricted, the
ward endures all the stigma of incompetent status.
When state action affects fundamental individual rights, the state
normally is restrained by constitutional due process protections83 that
require it to achieve its goals84 by the least intrusive methods. Apply-
ing these principles, the assistance provided to a mentally impaired
person should have as little impact on self-determination as possible. 6
However, competency proceedings do not seek to identify the least
restrictive alternative form of assistance. In many cases, both tradi-
tional and reform guardianship concepts remove more of the ward's
rights than required to compensate for the ward's diminished capabil-
ity.
The least restrictive alternative concept should be incorporated
into competency determination because of changes in society's values
an elderly person [who has a conservator] . . . since appointment of a conservator will be
adequate in most situations. The conservator's powers are ample to enable him to arrange
whatever physical care is necessary, typically nursing home care . . . ." Effland, Caring for
the Elderly Under the Uniform Probate Code, 17 AIZ. L. Ruv. 373, 378-79 (1975). This article,
contrary to its purpose, argues strongly against the sweeping powers given the conservator
under the U.P.C. by trivializing and dehumanizing the ward.
82. See Effland, supra note 81, at 384.
83. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ('No State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.").
84. Basic rights may be restricted when there is a "compelling state interest," provided
the degree of infringement is related to the state's interest in protecting society. See Lessard
v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded for a more specific
injunctive order, 414 U.S. 473, modified, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated, 421
U.S. 957 (1975), judgment reinstated, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
A number of commentators have observed that neither the interests of the state nor the
petitioner are justified in many guardianships. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 10, at 32 (con-
servatorship is an anachronism applied for inappropriate reasons); Frolik, supra note 6, at
617-18, 647-48 (guardianship counters deviant behavior in the elderly and controls the lower
class).
85. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488
(1960); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
86. See Covington v. Harris, 136 U.S. App. D.C. 35, 41, 419 F.2d 617, 623 (D.C.Cir. 1969);
It re Beverly, 342 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1977) (citing Lake v. Cameron, 124 U.S. App. D.C. 264,
267, 364 F.2d 657, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1966)); see also Recommended Judicial Practices, supra note
20, at 4-5.
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and in guardianship itself. Traditionally, guardianship proceedings
have been exempt from constitutional due process requirements be-
cause they were characterized as primarily benevolent, an action in
which the petitioner had nothing to gain and the respondent nothing
to lose, except the opportunity to have a guardian. In the absence of
significant conflicting interests, courts considered due process stand-
ards and identification of the least restrictive alternative unnecessary
to reach a fair and accurate result.s However, over the past twenty-
five years, society has recognized the tension between fundamental
liberties and benevolent assistance, and has adopted due process stand-
ards as the appropriate form of protection for the disabled individual.s
Identification of the least restrictive form of assistance also is
timely because guardianships are created today for individuals who
are far more aware and capable than wards of the past. Guardianship
once was reserved for the severely mentally impaired, whose property
needed management while the ward was committed or restrained at
home. 89 With the development of psychology and psychiatry, courts
extended guardianship to the mentally ill rather than restricting it to
the dangerously insane9 ° Individuals capable of managing their per-
87. See Rud v. Dahil, 578 F.2d 674, 679 (benevolence in the form of preventing dissipation
of the estate is an adequate substitute for procedural protection). Despite the Rud decision,
the Illinois Legislature in 1979 amended its guardianship statute to include guardians ad litem,
appointed counsel, and other due process protections. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 h (Smith-Hurd
1979); Jost, supra note 46, 1087, 1092-93; see also Frolik, supra note 6, at 609-10.
Actions based on the sovereign's parens patriae, its power and responsibility to act as a
benevolent parent for a citizen under legal disability, have been distinguished from those based
on police power. Exercise of the police power acknowledges the conflict of interest between the
individual and the community and requires due process to assure those interests are properly
weighed. See Horstman, Protective Services for the Elderly: The Limits of Parens Patrae, 40
Mo. L. REV. 215, 219-22 (1975) ("Parens patriae power [includes] the duty to protect persons
under legal disabilities to act for themselves, [a] classic example of this role is [when a state
undertakes] to act as the general guardian of all infants, idiots and lunatics." O'Connor v.
Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 582 (1975)).
88. See Mitchell, supra note 24, at 1410-12 n.32; see also Heyford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393
(10th Cir. 1968) (notice and counsel); Kendall v. True, 391 F. Supp. 413 (W.D. Ky. 1975)
(preliminary hearing and notice); Bell v. Wayne County Gen. Hosp., 384 F. Supp. 1085 (E.D.
Mich. 1974) (notice); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473, on remand 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974),
vacated and remanded, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), judgment reinstated, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis.
1976) (hearing and notice); Developments in the Law - Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill,
87 HARv. L. REV. 1190 (1974).
89. See M'Elroy's Case, 6 Watts & Serg. 451, 460 (Pa. 1843) (describing the expanding
definition of incompetence); Rohan, supra note 53, at 4.
90. See Note, supra note 16, at 678-79, nn.15-24.
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sonal affairs and not in need of restraint could have guardians ap-
pointed solely for property management. 91 Reform guardianship stat-
utes include a still larger segment of the population as prospective
wards by shifting the emphasis of the definition of incompetency to
quality of judgment. These individuals' powers cannot fairly be
stripped away in the traditional all-or-nothing guardianship.
Alternatives the court should consider to identify the least restric-
tive form of assistance for the mentally impaired are described in case
law on civil commitment. Civil commitment closely resembles guard-
ianship because it required a declaration of incompetency and provides
involuntary services to a mentally impaired individual. In a civil
commitment proceeding, a person must have the opportunity to con-
sent to voluntary assistance by having the services conscientiously
explained, or the court must find that the person is unable to determine
whether the services are necessary. 93 The court must consider assist-
ance of family and friends, and all social and community services to
determine whether they are sufficient to meet the person's need, and
must specifically find them inappropriate.9
These standards are aptly applied to guardianship, perhaps particu-
larly for the elderly person. State and federal government fund social
services that enable the elderly to continue living in the community.
For many elderly persons, the loss of decisionmaking capabilities is
slow or uneven, involving periods of excellent lucidity. Moreover, many
older persons have family, friends, and neighbors willing to take some
responsibility for their welfare.
1. Limited Guardianship
Traditional guardianship statutes distinguish only two categories
of powers: personal decisionmaldng and management of property.95
Regardless of the ward's capabilities, the guardian receives all the
ward's delegable powers in one or both of these broad areas. All the
ward's nondelegable powers, such as voting, are lost. Such a drastic
impact on the ward's autonomy usually is unjustified, particularly for
the great many elderly wards who are capable of expressing prefer-
91. Id. at 679-80.
92. See infra notes 108-15. But cf. Horstman, supra note 87, at 231-59 (emphasizing distinc-
tions between involuntary commitment based on police power and guardianship based on protect-
ing individuals and safeguarding assets).
93. See, e.g., In re Beverly, 342 So. 2d 481, 489 (Fla. 1977).
94. Id. at 486.
95. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 744.102(1) (1987).
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ences and making some decisions about both property and personal
matters.9
Limited guardianship more accurately limits the guardian's author-
ity to decisions the ward is incapable of making, by defining areas of
the guardian's powers that correspond to the ward's incapabilities.
97
The ward is presumed to be only partly incapacitated, and any author-
ity not specifically transferred to the guardian remains with the ward.
However, the limited guardianship concept fails to identify the least
restrictive form of assistance because it considers only assistance pro-
vided through guardianship.9 The court is not required to consider
alternative forms of assistance that have a lesser impact on the indi-
vidual's fundamental rights than guardianships.
2. Guardianship Diversion
The service a guardian most commonly provides, financial manage-
ment, often can be effectively provided without an adjudication of
96. See Regan, supra note 36, at 608.
97. See, e.g., ABA MODEL STATUTE, supra note 25, at § 12; Fla. S. 196 § 744.331(5) (Reg.
Sess. 1988, introduced by S. Woodson and S. Dudley). A survey of over 300 New Hampshire
cases revealed 14 common areas in which wards were found to be incapacitated and guardians
given the authority to act:
1. Travel, or deciding where to live.
2. Refusal or consent to medical treatment, counseling services, or other profes-
sional care where consent is legally necessary.
3. Making contracts.
4. Possession or management of real or personal property or income from any
source.
5. Making gifts.
6. Initiating, defending or settling lawsuits.
. Lending or borrowing money.
8. Paying or collecting debts.
9. Managing or operating a business.
10. Waiving the provisions of a will.
11. Continuing to act as a member of a partnership.
12. Admitting himself/herself to New Hampshire hospital or any other institution
or treatment on a voluntary basis.
13. Accessing and releasing confidential records and papers.
14. Making decisions concerning education.
See Cassananto, Saunders & Simon, supra note 23, at 15 (citing N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§
464-A:25, -A:26 (1985)).
98. See Fla. S. 196, § 744.331(5) (Reg. Sess. 1988, introduced by S. Woodson & S. Dudley).
But see ABA MODEL STATUTE, supra note 25, at § 11 (services may be ordered without
adjudication of total incompetency).
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incompetency through guardianship diversion.9 The court secures from
the parties a comprehensive agreement to meet the respondent's
needs; the agreement may include the type and frequency of any
services necessary for the ward's well being. Such court-ordered finan-
cial services provide an opportunity for nonintrusive assistance in hous-
ing, social service, and health care decisions. A system of social serv-
ices exists to meet the special needs of the elderly for living assist-
ance °"o and many elderly have younger family members who are cap-
able of providing care. 10
The competency proceeding continues to serve an important func-
tion in obtaining effective services when guardianship diversion is an
option. The court evaluates the appropriateness of the petitioner's
proposals, and must find the respondent sufficiently incapacitated to
warrant creation of a guardianship in the absence of alternative assist-
ance.10 2 The court protects the respondent from being coerced into
accepting unnecessary and intrusive services to avoid an adjudication
of incompetency. It further provides recourse in the event the agree-
ment fails to secure the services, and must be enforced or revised. 103
99. See Westbrook, Alternatives to Guardianship Emerging, in THE AGING CONNECTION,
Oct./Nov. 1987 (notes $800,000 fmding of 36-month guardianship diversion program in Los
Angeles); GUARDIANSHIP ALTERNATIVE NEWS, Spring 1988, at 1, col.2 (guardianship diversion
program began in Florida in 1982 to allow court-ordered guardian).
100. Social services for the elderly are provided primarily through the federal Older Amer-
icans Act, (OAA) and Community Block Grant Development funds, and in Florida by Community
Care for the Elderly. Service packages include congregate meals, home delivered meals, home-
maker and home health aides, assistance, transportation, consumer education, chore service,
companionship, counselling, legal assistance, and other services. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1397a-e,
3001-3003 (1986) (supporting services similar to the OAA's, targeted for poor elderly); WORKING
PAPER, supra note 34, at 48-49 (asserting the state may be required to provide a variety of
services, including guardians and community based care).
101. See Ricklets, Adult Children of Elderly Parents Hire Surrogates to Oversee Care,
Wall St. J., May 20, 1988, at 35, col. 3.
102. Wisconsin protective services are provided on the finding that, if no services are
provided, the respondent suffers a substantial risk of physical harm or deterioration. See Greenley
& Zander, New Legal Protection for Persons with Mental Handicaps, Wis. B. BULL., Apr.
1986, at 9.
Borderline cases, under current law, might be briefly under the care of a guardianship
organization that provides stabilizing financial and personal case management, then petitions to
have the ward's competency restored. The steps of temporary incompetency and restoration
would be eliminated under a diversion system. Interview with Frank Repensek, supra note 63.
103. See ABA MODEL STATUTE, supra note 25, at § 11 (alternative or diversion services
include social and financial services on a contractual basis).
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B. Summary
The scope of guardianship services includes a variety of services
that can be provided without the creation of guardianship. Guardian-
ship diversion, the provision of financial management and social service
assistance to one who without such services would need a guardian,
represents a re-adjustment of the law to the variety of services avail-
able in our complex society. It assures that those who only need
assistance will not have to endure the stigma of incapacity and guar-
dianship.
The objective of a guardianship action should be to provide the
impaired individual with the least restrictive alternative form of assist-
ance. This language should be found in the statement of legislative
intent in Florida's guardianship statute. Before declaring incompetency
and creating a guardianship, the court should determine the respon-
dent is unable to manage personal decisions or property management
even with all the assistance available from family, friends, and social
service providers. If such assistance is sufficient to meet the respon-
dent's needs, the court may order agreements for regular assistance
and retain jurisdiction to monitor service effectiveness. If a guardian-
ship is necessary, the court should transfer to the guardian only those
powers the ward is incapable of exercising independently.
IV. THE PROTECTION OF PROCEDURAL FORMALITY
The extent of formality required in any proceeding depends on its
usefulness in reaching an accurate result. Components of procedural
due process include notice, right to counsel, and hearing rights; these
rights facilitate the testing of evidence such as specified burdens and
standards of proof, right to cross-examine witnesses, and use of the
rules of evidence. The test for the appropriate level of due process
includes consideration of the nature of the private interest affected
and the risk of error balanced against the effectiveness of additional
safeguards. If no fundamental right is affected, the fiscal and adminis-
trative burdens to the government providing the procedural protection
are considered. °4
In guardianship actions, the ward's fundamental liberty interests
are restricted even when only a guardianship of the property, or
conservatorship, is created. 1°5 Yet, traditional competency proceed-
104. On the test for appropriate procedural due process, see Mashaw, The Supreme Court's
Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors
in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 48 (1976).
105. See supra notes 77-93 and accompanying text.
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ings, including Florida's, have been conducted as informally as possi-
ble.' °0 The great majority of respondents have no counsel and are not
present at the competency hearing. Members of the examining commit-
tee rarely are present for cross-examination on the contents of their
report. If the committee reports findings of incompetency, the burden
of proof shifts to the respondent to refute the petitioner's allegations.
The unchallenged presentation of inaccurate evidence and lack of rigor-
ous inquiry produces a substantial risk of error.117
Nevertheless, courts are reluctant to apply the standards of crim-
inal due process to guardianship actions because any additional time,
costs, and possibilities of an unpleasant adversarial encounter might
discourage family members and other benevolent petitioners from
seeking guardianships for incompetent persons. While such concerns
may be valid, they fail to describe all the likely effects of applying
due process protection in guardianship actions.
Due process enables the respondent to resist the allegations in the
petition, thus the total number of guardianships would be reduced.
Because some petitions request adjudication of competent persons,
resistance to the petition logically must reduce the number of guardian-
ships for competent as well as incompetent persons. Unless providing
more information to the court produces entirely random results, more
competent than incompetent persons would successfully resist adjudi-
cation. In addition, the necessity of proving the allegations may dis-
courage borderline or bad faith petitions. A persuasive argument based
on more accurate competency determinations and constitutional issues
exists for providing due process in guardianship actions despite their
benevolent character.
Courts have identified a level of due process appropriate to actions
that are of a mixed benevolent and adversarial character. In civil
commitment, which the courts have recognized as primarily benevo-
lent,16 notice that includes only date, time, and place of hearing has
been held insufficient. 10 The respondent is entitled to counsel ap-
106. FLA. STAT. § 744.331(4) (1987) (hearings are to be conducted in as informal a manner
as may be consistent with orderly procedure); see Gay v. McCaughan, 105 So. 2d 771, 774 (Fla.
1958) (proceedings regarding curatorship and guardianship of the property are not subject to
rules governing adversary suit).
107. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (press inquiry of results); Katz v. Superior
Court, 73 Cal. App. 3d 952, 969, 141 Cal. Rptr. 234, 244 (Ct. App. 1977) (in guardianship that
results in restraint of one's person, the test of certainty must be that applied to the criminal
law because fundamental rights are at stake).
108. See In re Beverly, 342 So. 2d 481, 485 (Fla. 1977) (basis of action in parens patriae).
109. See Dale v. Hahn, 486 F.2d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 826 (1974).
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pointed by the court at all stages of the proceeding that may result
in detrimental change to liberty. 110 The diagnosis, which provides the
principal evidence opposing the respondent's autonomy, must be based
on expert testimony."', However, even expert testimony cannot substi-
tute for the court's legal conclusions because the judicial system must
be accountable for the severe legal consequences."2 At hearing, strict
adherence to the rules of evidence is imperative,"1 and the burden of
proof remains with the petitioner. No civil commitment may take place
unless "clear and convincing" evidence indicates the action is neces-
sary.114 These procedural due process standards are considered as cost-
effective means to reduce the risk of error.
Courts have distinguished guardianship, which provides decision-
making authority to the guardian, from civil commitment, which neces-
sarily results in the respondent's institutionalization. However, many
petitioners initiate guardianship proceedings for the elderly specifically
to place the prospective ward in an institution such as a nursing home.
This involuntary change of residence is sometimes the only substantial
service the guardian provides. Thus the principal difference between
civil commitment and guardianship is that the patient in the mental
institution receives treatment and periodic review on the issue of
discharge while the nursing home resident receives none. This reason-
ing strongly suggests the procedural standards of civil commitment
are the minimum that should be required in guardianship actions.
All the components of procedural due process should be available
and routinely used in guardianship actions."n The particular usefulness
of each element, and the most efficient delivery of due process protec-
tion for prospective wards is considered below.
110. See Beverly, 342 So. 2d at 489.
111. FLA. STAT. § 394.467(3)(a) (1987).
112. Beverly, 342 So. 2d at 484 (quoting Finken v. Roop, 234 Pa. Super. 155, 182, 339 A.2d
764, 778 (Super. Ct. 1975), appeal dismissed, 424 U.S. 960 (1976)).
113. Id. at 484-85. In civil commitment, the Florida Supreme Court requires that a strict
burden of proof be met before the individual's liberty is restricted. Id. The threatened deprivation
of liberty in civil commitment requires application of due process. See Frolik, supra note 6, at
625. Guardianship frequently results in institutionalization of the ward in a nursing home, is
often initiated particularly for this purpose, and this institutionalization may be the only service
the guardian provides to the ward. See supra text accompanying notes 108-13; infra text accom-
panying note 114.
114. See Beverly, 342 So. 2d at 487-88 (citing State v. Valdez, 88 N.M. 338, 540 P.2d 818
(1975)). The "clear and convincing" standard was defined in Florida in Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Vanater, 297 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1974).
115. See National Guardianship Symposium Proceedings, supra note 25.
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A. Notice
Notice that fails to communicate sufficient information may fail to
satisfy due process requirements. When protected liberty and property
interests are at stake, as they are in competency proceedings, suffi-
cient information includes an explanation of the nature of the proceed-
ings, the possible consequences, and the respondent's rights. 116 Courts
have required such explanations when the proceedings involve persons
who, by reason of their disability, may be vulnerable, isolated, and
without knowledge of their legal rights. 1 7
Florida's statutory requirements for notice of a competency pro-
ceeding do not meet these standards. The statute requires only that
the respondent receive written notice that an application has been
made for an inquiry into either his physical or mental condition, or
both, with the time and place of the hearing."18 Ordinarily, the petition
is attached. The notice must be sent to relatives living in the same
county as the respondent, if the petitioner knows of any."9 The court
may hold a hearing at any time after service of notice.m
Because virtually all prospective wards are impaired, such notice
may not convey the nature and significance of the proceeding. An
elderly impaired person receiving a copy of the petition with a hearing
date may become confused about its meaning and the appropriate
response because of unfamiliarity, stress, poor eyesight, or any number
of other causes. Because the petitioner may not know the respondent's
relatives and friends and has no incentive to help the respondent resist
the petition, individuals who might offer the respondent assistance
might never receive notice and remain unaware of the action.
Notice that provides the respondent with the information and time
to prepare should state in large type and plain language 12 the possible
consequences of the competency proceeding and the respondent's
rights,2 as well as the time and place of the hearing. A plainclothes
116. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (type of notice
adequate to meet constitutional due process requirements can only be determined by individual
circumstances of the proceeding).
117. See Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U.S. 141 (1956) (recipient should be able, from the
notice, to understand the nature of the proceedings).
118. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1092 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded
for a more specific injunctive order, 414 U.S. 473, modified, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis.
1974), vacated, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), judgment reinstated, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
For discussion of notice issues, see Frolik, supra note 6, at 637-38; Jost, supra note 46, at 1094-95.
119. FLA. STAT. §§ 744.331(4), .337(1) (1987); FLA. R.P. & G.P. 5.550.
120. FLA. STAT. §§ 744.331(4), .337(1) (1987).
121. Id. § 744.331(4).
122. See WORKING PAPER, supra note 34, at 39.
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court officer who is familiar with the impairments of aging or other
disabilities should personally deliver the information to the respondent.
The officer should read the information aloud to provide opportunity
for questions and clarification. After service of notice, at least four-
teen days should elapse before the hearing.A4
Notice to friends and relatives is particularly important when their
assistance might eliminate the need for guardianship. Notice should
be sent by mail to any individuals the prospective ward identifies
within three days after the prospective ward received notice that
guardianship proceedings have begun. The petitioner also should be
required to serve relatives and significant others living outside the
county.-
B. Use of Counsel and Guardians ad Litem
All states allow a prospective ward to have legal counselus and
many provide for appointed counsel,m but in many jurisdictions, pro-
spective wards routinely waive that right.m The arguments against
the practice of routinely appointing counsel arise primarily from con-
cerns with cost effectiveness; many courts reach correct adjudications
without representation so that additional legal costs are unnecessary. m
This assumes the ward has no significant information or perspective
to present to the court; it assumes the respondent is incompetent.
123. See National Guardianship Symposium Proceedings, supra note 25; Recommended
Judicial Practices, supra note 20, at 3.
124. See Recommended Judicial Practices, supra note 20, at 3. Statutes provide for 3 to
20 days, while in practice 7 to 90 days elapse between notice and hearing. Twenty-three states
had no statutory requirement in 1986. Id. at 13.
125. See id. at 3. Constructive notice and waiver of notice have been found to be inapprop-
riate to guardianship proceedings. For example, in Texas and Ohio, actual service must be
completed for jurisdiction. See In re Guardianship of Corless, 2 Ohio App. 3d 92, 440 N.E.2d
1203 (Ct. App. 1982); Dyers v. Walls, 645 S.W.2d 317 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982). Waiver of notice
is prohibited under the Uniform Probate Code. U.P.C. § 5-304(d) (1982).
126. WORKING PAPER, supra note 34, at 38.
127. Abuses in Guardianship, supra note 11 (thirty-six statutes, including Florida's, allow
for appointed counsel). Routine appointment of counsel raises issues such as small fees and
perfunctory representation. See WORKING PAPER, supra note 34, at 38.
128. Good & King, supra note 9, at 1A, col. 2. In civil commitment, a person has a right
to effective assistance of counsel at all stages of the commitment process that might result in
a detrimental change to the condition of his or her liberty. See, e.g., In re Beverly, 342 So. 2d
481, 489 (Fla. 1977). The trial judge must specifically find whether or not the alleged incompetent
is represented by counsel in any civil hearing, and whether or not counsel should be afforded.
See In re Guardianship of Paunack, 355 So. 2d 1195 (Fla. 1978).
129. See supra text accompanying notes 87-88 (benevolent nature of guardianship proceed-
ings).
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Resistance to guardianship petitions with the help of legal counsel
will reduce erroneous findings of incompetency, and discourage border-
line or bad faith petitions. 130 Because the respondent has a right to
counsel, and routine use of counsel increases the accuracy of compe-
tency proceedings, indigent prospective wards should not be deprived
of assistance of counsel. Logically, the court should appoint a lawyer
for each respondent who has not retained one. The court should not
consider the respondent to have waived the right to counsel unless it
determines the waiver is knowing and voluntary. 131
However, even advocates of the routine use of counsel may hesitate
to recommend appointment in every case because of confusion over
the attorney's role in guardianship actions. Professional ethics require
an attorney to advocate only the client's preferences concerning legal
rights, a role that many feel is inappropriate if the client cannot com-
municate well, or has some preferences beyond the realm of possibil-
ity.132 In such cases, the attorney may needlessly complicate the case
with groundless arguments.
On consideration, requiring the court to appoint counsel in every
case is more desirable than requiring it to determine from scant pre-
hearing information those few cases in which counsel is inappropriate.
Regardless of the prospective ward's condition, the attorney takes the
responsibility of the advocacy role that otherwise is neglected. Indeed,
the extremely impaired ward is in greatest need of an advocate to
preserve any aspect of autonomy he still is capable of independently
exercising. Under reform statutes that require limited guardianships,
very few wards have no legal rights to preserve.'3 There undoubtedly
will be cases in which the attorney's advocacy role is very limited,
and the fee correspondingly low.
If the client cannot communicate with legal counsel, a guardian ad
litem may provide the most effective way to assure that the respon-
dent's best interests are represented.' M The guardian ad litem also
can determine the respondent's needs when his stated preferences are
130. See Frolik, supra note 6, at 631-32.
131. See National Guardianship Symposium Proceedings, supra note 25.
132. The U.P.C. would appoint an attorney as a guardian ad litem, in effect depriving the
prospective ward of legal advocacy. See U.P.C. § 5-303(e) (1982). Counsel should be appointed
whenever respondent's wishes are in conflict with the recommendations of the guardian ad litem.
See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 2, para. lla-10(b) (Smith-Hurd 1987).
133. See Krauskopf, supra note 35, at 63-64 (once having left the role of advocate, the
attorney is less likely to challenge expert testimony and will contribute to the routine approval
of all guardianships); see also Recommended Judicial Practices, supra note 20, at 21-22; Frolik,
supra note 6, at 633-35 & n.250 (distinctly different roles for counsel and guardian ad litem).
134. See, e.g., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 464-A (1985); Frolik, supra note 6, at 635-36.
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iMl-advised. 1" The professionally trained guardian ad litem, who may
be an attorney, can provide objective information to all participants
in the guardianship action. 1 Appointing a guardian ad litem to inves-
tigate immediately on service of notice can simplify many proceedings
that the appointment of counsel cannot.
The court should appoint an attorney for each respondent who
lacks counsel. The prospective ward's attorney should be restricted
to the traditional role of advocate, advising the client in the language
or mode of communication most likely to convey all the options avail-
able, as well as the practical and legal consequences of those options
and the probability of success in pursuing any one of them. 137 The
skills of an attorney serving as guardian ad litem should be available
to the court for investigation and assistance to the advocate when the
respondent has difficulty communicating feasible preferences. The ad-
vocate attorney should pursue the course of action chosen by the
client, or by the guardian ad litem if the client cannot choose."
C. The Examining Committee
To investigate the alleged incompetent's condition, the court ap-
points an examining committee. In Florida, the committee includes
one responsible citizen and two practicing physicians to serve the court
as experts in determination of competency. 139 Such a committee lacks
the expertise to conduct the functional assessment necessary to deter-
mine the behavioral aspect of the respondent's competency. 40 Current
guardianship statutes require neither knowledge of the impairments
of aging nor expertise in other areas of alleged disability. The relevant
statute describes no procedure for the examination, which may be
very brief.'4 ' The statute requires the committee to report to the court
the apparent cause of the respondent's condition, and whether it con-
siders the condition chronic.'4 Terse and conclusory statements, how-
135. See Jost, supra note 46, at 1094.
136. The guardian ad litem should inform the respondent of hearings and rights to assure
fair participation and make recommendations to the court as to the ward's needs, including the
need for counsel. See, e.g., Greenley & Zander, supra note 102, at 9; see also ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 110 , para. lla-10(b) (Smith-Hurd 1987) (the guardian ad item consults with the respondent
and recommends whether counsel should be appointed).
137. See National Guardianship Symposium Proceedings, supra note 25.
138. See id.
139. On role of the guardian ad litem, see Greenley & Zander, supra note 102, at 11; Mozer
& Chamberlin, Guardianships for Disabled Adults, ILL. B.J., Nov. 1985, 128, at 129-30.
140. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (effect of examining committee composition).
141. FLA. STAT. § 744.31(5)(a) (1987); see Good & King, supra note 9, Dec. 14, 1986, at
1A, col. 1.
142. FLA. STAT. § 744.331(5)(b) (1987).
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ever, are not uncommon; the report generally states a conclusion about
the respondent's legal competency."4
The determination of competency requires the opinions of a medical
doctor to assess physical condition, a psychologist or psychiatrist to
assess mental condition, and a social worker or community health
professional to assess functional capability. However, because these
disciplines each have become quite specialized, every professional may
not have the skill and experience necessary to form an expert opinion
in a guardianship action. This is particularly true for the aged respon-
dent, because of society's pervasive myths and misinformation about
aging.
The examining committee should include expertise in medicine,
psychology, functional assessment, and the area of the principal alleged
disability. Individual members of the examining committee might pos-
sess any combination of these skills, but to ensure a diversity of
viewpoints, the committee should never have fewer than three mem-
bers. Some rural jurisdictions may have to rely on experts from adjoin-
ing areas.
Each committee member should be required to examine the respon-
dent in person and report to the court the causes, manifestations, and
prognosis for any conditions found. Whenever possible, the examina-
tion should be conducted at the respondent's usual residence to
minimize the disabling effects of apprehension and fatigue. 4 No com-
mittee member should report a conclusion on the respondent's legal
competency. The court should weigh the examining committee's report
as it would any other expert testimony.
Members of the examining committee should have no interest in
the outcome of the proceeding. 145 Conflicts most frequently arise when
a committee member's professional autonomy is not maintained free
of the influence of the financial and personal care system, or when
the member is personally connected with the petitioner and ward. 46
To protect committees from professional compromise, the court should
143. See id.
144. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 49-606(c)(4) (Supp. 1980) (evaluation shall be conducted
with as little interference with the proposed ward's activities as possible).
145. See Nolan, gupra note 40, at 210-11.
146. Practitioners have observed that committees that have the same membership in all
cases have sometimes caused the members to depend on routine affirmation of petitions. It has
been suggested that a system of rotating participation in examining committees among members
of the local bar and medical community would maintain rigorous standards of inquiry. Telephone
interview with Leon Whitehead, Member of Florida Bar Committee on the Elderly and experi-
enced practitioner in estate planning (Nov. 1987).
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choose members on a rotating basis from a substantial segment of
professionals in the community. If the pool is extremely small, the
court should take the initiative to find more professionals who are
willing to serve. The committee member most likely to be personally
involved is the ward's doctor. Though the respondent's family physician
may be an excellent resource, the court should consider the extent to
which a report is likely to reflect conflicting interests within the family
before appointing the family doctor to the examining committee.
D. The Competency Hearing
Under current Florida law and practice, courtroom procedure does
little to test and develop the evidence. Many hearings, attended only
by the judge and the petitioner, conclude within minutes. 147 Rules of
evidence do not apply.1' Committee members are rarely subpoenaed
for cross-examination on the conclusions in the report.149
Such practices fail to provide the court with the quality of informa-
tion necessary to accurately determine competency. Especially with
the adoption of a least restrictive alternative standard in limited guard-
ianship, the court must choose the most appropriate among many
options for the respondent's well-being. Courts need the opportunity
to test the persuasiveness of evidence about the prospective ward's
capabilities and impairments.1
Courts should conduct guardianship hearings in a way that enables
the respondent to participate. The respondent should be present, re-
gardless of where the hearing is held, unless the court specifically
determines presence is not in the respondent's best interests. 151 The
hearing should be open unless the respondent requests otherwise.152
147. Good & King, supra note 9, at 1A, col. 1.
148. Incompetency and guardianship proceedings are subject only to subpoena, deposition,
and discovery rules. See FLA. R.C.P. §§ 1.280-.410. In all other matters, the proceeding is
subject to Rules of Probate and Guardianship. See FLA. R.P. & G. §§ 5.010-.180, 5.540-.710.
149. See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
150. See Jost, supra note 46, at 1096; Nolan, supra note 40, at 210-11 (a heavy burden is
on judges in guardianship proceedings to make determinations with inadequate evidence).
151. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch 110 , para. 11a-l (Smith-Hurd 1987); TEx. PROB.
CODE ANN. § 13OG (Vernon 1980) (limited guardianship for developmentally disabled); U.P.C.
§ 5-303(c) (1982) (trauma to respondent should be balanced with preservation of rights). Hearings
may be held at locations more accessible and less threatening than that at the courthouse. See
Recommended Judicial Practices, supra note 20, at 17 (recommending that the court allow the
respondent to participate by telephone if transportation or a hearing at home is impossible).
152. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 49-606 (Supp. 1987) (the public may be excluded at the
respondent's request); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 , para. la-ll (Smith-Hurd 1987); TEX. PROB.
CODE ANN. § 130G (Vernon 1988).
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If the respondent's limitations warrant it, the court should consider
holding the hearing in the respondent's usual residence. Alternatively,
the judge might interview the respondent by telephone. 153 The location
should be readily accessible to the handicapped, and waiting should
be minimized to preserve the respondent's energy and emotional re-
sources. Special equipment and lighting should be provided for respon-
dents whose hearing or vision is impaired. If appropriate, the judge
should instruct all participants to speak slowly and clearly.
The court should consider the validity of the evidence under the
rules of evidence that govern other procedures. The respondent's coun-
sel should routinely have the opportunity to cross-examine the commit-
tee and anyone presenting evidence favoring the petition. 154 The court
should treat the committee report skeptically and scrutinize it for
internal inconsistencies.' The committee report should support allega-
tions in the petition and the court should give medical testimony no
greater weight than it normally gives expert testimony.1 An unfavor-
able committee report should not shift the burden of proof from the
petitioner' 57 to respondent; the burden of proof should remain with
petitioner. The burden shifts primarily because the court accepts the
report as such strong evidence that it is virtually dispositive of the
case. Skeptical treatment of the report should help to correct this
error. However, the old-fashioned practice may be more promptly and
thoroughly changed by instruction in the court rules.
Most traditional statutes, including Florida's, do not define the
standard of proof. However, many limited guardianship statutes adopt
the "clear and convincing" standard, which is applied in civil commit-
ment. Florida should adopt the "clear and convincing" standard for
guardianship actions.
V. THE ACTIVE COURT: INVESTIGATION AND SUPERVISION' s
Judicial supervision is one of the principal benefits of guardianship
153. See National Guardianship Symposium Proceedings, supra note 25.
154. See U.P.C. § 5-303(c) (1982).
155. See Recommended Judicial Practices, supra note 20, at 24.
156. The party bearing the affirmative of an issue bears the burden of proof in guardianship
as in other proceedings. Beck v. Beck, 383 So. 2d 268, 270-71 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1980).
157. However, the court may instruct the petitioner to amend the petition, or consider it
amended as hearsay. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525.551(2) (West Supp. 1987) (petition for
guardianship may result in conservatorship).
158. In states having probate courts of chancery, guardianships may not be relegated to
probate courts. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3914(a) (1987); MISS. CODE ANN. §
93-13-251 (1972); TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-2-101 (1984). Segregating guardianships in probate
courts seems inappropriate and perhaps symbolic in that all other business is concerned with
983
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to the ward. 159 The Florida Supreme Court has observed that many
safeguards are placed around guardians' administration of estates, 16°
and guardians are held to the strictest accountability as trustees.'6'
Such supervision should begin when the petition is filed and continue
for the duration of the guardianship. However, the court has little
investigatory or monitoring capacity to assure the suitability of guar-
dianship services.ca
Traditionally, petitions have lacked detail and specificity about the
proposed ward and the qualifications of the proposed guardian.16
Florida's statute requires basic information about the alleged incompe-
tent such as age and address, some statement of the nature of incapac-
ity, the type of guardianship requested, the property involved, and
the names and addresses of the petitioner and next of kin. 64 Although
convicted felons and persons incapable of discharging the duties of a
guardian are disqualified from appointment, 165 no information about
the guardian is specifically required. Because the mere filing of a
petition produces serious intrusions into the respondent's privacy, the
National Guardianship Symposium in July 1988, recommended that
the petition include specific information about the physical and mental
condition of the proposed ward, along with the reasons for the re-
quested guardianship. The Symposium would require, on a petition
form available in every jurisdiction, the qualifications of the individual
to serve as guardian, specific information about the steps taken to
find less restrictive alternatives to guardianship, and a specific descrip-
tion of the guardianship powers sought.'r
The court should have resources to investigate the allegations in
the petition whenever appropriate. Even in the absence of statutory
the dead. See Friedman & Savage, supra note 8, at 275; Note, supra note 16, at 676 n.73
(guardian of estate equated to executor).
159. See also Recommended Judicial Practices, supra note 20, at viii (the court has ultimate
responsibility for monitoring the ward's condition and continuing needs).
160. In re Guardianship of Krecl, 85 So. 2d 727, 730 (Fla. 1956).
161. In re Nusbaum's Guardianship, 152 Fla. 31, 34, 10 So. 2d 661, 663 (1942); McBride
v. McBride, 142 Fla. 663, 667, 195 So. 602, 603 (1940).
162. A guardian of the person is required to care for the ward humanely, to honor reasonable
preferences as to place and standard of living, and provide the ward with annual physical and
mental examinations. FLA. STAT. §§ 744.361, .364 (1987). A guardian of the property must
protect and preserve the ward's property and account for it faithfully. Id. § 744.377(1)(a).
163. National Guardianship Symposium Proceedings, supra note 25.
164. See FLA. STAT. § 744.334 (1987).
165. See id. § 744.309(4).
166. See National Guardianship Symposium Proceedings, supra note 25 (procedural due
process).
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authority, the court can exercise its inherent power to appoint an
impartial investigator and other experts to assure adequate, objective
information. Investigation of petitions is appropriately handled by a
guardianship officer responsible for the investigation of guardians' ac-
tivities. 167
At present, courts lack sufficient information on which to base
guardianship investigations. A guardian of the person must file an
annual report of the ward's residence, the length of stay of the ward
at each place, medical treatment, the guardian's activities, visits with
the guardian, a physician's report, and an evaluation of the approp-
riateness of restoring competent status.16 A guardian of the property
must file an annual return with an account of transactions in the ward's
assets. 169 The reports are intended to inform the court of the ward's
needs and the appropriateness of the guardianship.
However, the court will not change the ward's circumstances or
status in response to the report. The guardian also must file a petition
for a court order. 70 The court will not hold a hearing on the information
in a return unless an objection is filed.' 7' If the guardian fails to file
a return, the court shall order filing within fifteen days and after that
time cite the guardian for contempt.Y2 However, the statute provides
no sanctions for a guardian of the person who fails to file a report.1 7
In practice, in many jurisdictions, even the filing of reports and returns
is supervised very casually.' 74
The court should fulfill its role as safeguard of its ward by estab-
lishing a system for the eduction of guardians and supervision of their
performance 75 Initially, courts should establish standards for guard-
ians' performance that provide more guidance than the broad concept
of fiduciary duty. In accord with the least restrictive alternative stand-
ard of limited guardianship, the court should instruct guardians to
167. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 1851.5 (West 1987).
168. FLA. STAT. § 744.367 (1987).
169. Id. § 744.427.
170. Id. § 744.371.
171. Id. § 744.427(5)-(6).
172. Id. § 744.431.
173. Possible causes of action for the competent individual who has been subjected to
competency proceedings include malicious prosecution, abuse of process, false imprisonment,
and infliction of emotional distress. See Krauskopf, supra note 35, at 65-67. On appeal of adjudi-
cation of incompetency, see Mitchell, supra note 24, at 1425.
174. See Good & King, suprm note 9, Dec. 14, 1986, at 16A, col. 2.
175. Professional standards are being developed and can be used by the courts as guides.
The National Guardianship Association, 527 S. Wells St., Suite 300, Chicago, Ill. 60607, held a
second annual meeting to consider standards in Chicago on Oct. 30-Nov. 2, 1988.
HeinOnline  -- 40 U. Fla. L. Rev. 985 1988
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
develop maximum self reliance and independence in the ward.16 Such
activities may require expenditures of the ward's assets that would
have been questionable under traditional conservatorship concepts.
However, the concept of estate conservation is particularly ill-suited
to the circumstances of the elderly ward. The guardian should be
encouraged to use the assets humanely to develop the capabilities and
satisfy the preferences of the ward.rn
The guardian and ward to some extent become co-managers of the
ward's affairs, a role the court describes in the context of voluntary
guardianship. The difficulties of co-management may be the reason
voluntary guardianship is seldom used. However, limited guardianship
differs from voluntary guardianship in that the ward cannot withdraw
the guardian's authority simply by petitioning the court.178 Because
the ward is, in specific matters, legally incompetent, the guardian has
authority to proceed in accord with independent good judgment. 7 9
The courts should educate and encourage guardians to communicate
and cooperate with their wards.
To help ensure that guardians fulfill their roles, every circuit should
establish the position of guardianship clerk and provide adequate staff.
The guardianship clerk, who should be an attorney, should review
petitions, annual reports and returns, and make recommendations to
the court for investigations and hearings. In the report, the guardian
should be required to prove the continuing need for planned services.
The court should fine guardians who fail to file their returns or perform
other required duties. If the guardian does not pay the fine promptly
176. See Jost, supra note 46, at 1099 (citing ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 , para. la-3(b)
(Smith-Hurd 1987)).
177. Id. at 1097-1101.
178. Limitations on the guardian's powers raise some concern that third parties would be
reluctant to enter transactions where uncertainty exists as to their exact legal authority. Note,
Limited Guardianship: Survey of Implementation Considerations, 15 A.B.A. REAL PROP.
PROB. TR. L.J. 544, 546 (1980). To clarify that authority, Illinois law centers on the limited
guardian of the property all powers of estate management not specifically reserved to the ward.
See ILL. STAT. ANN. 110 , para. lla-3 (Smith-Hurd 1987); Jost, supra note 46, at 1101.
179. See Bryan v. Century Nat'l Bank, 498 So. 2d 868, 873 (Fla. 1986). In the context of
voluntary guardianship, the court describes the procedure for oversight of new powers and
specific acts by a voluntary guardian:
The approval need not follow a long and drawn-out process. First, notice need be
given only to the ward and those specified by the ward. Second, the court need
only ensure that the ward is aware of and does not contest the action, that the
transaction will not interfere with the ward's maintenance or living expenses, and
that, in sum the transaction is in the ward's best interests.
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from his own funds, the court should collect the amount due when it
authorizes the next payment of the guardian's fees. Furthermore, the
guardian who fails to fulfill his duties should be removed.1so
To help ensure understanding of the guardian's role, the court
should require each person seeking to serve as a guardian to complete
a program of education. To develop such a program, probate court
judges should be educated and their responses incorporated into a
statewide guardianship education model. The program should be avail-
able to attorneys, and required for those who wish to be appointed
by the court as advocates in guardianship cases. The training should
include information on the rights and procedures applicable in guar-
dianship proceedings, the aging process, societal myths, and
stereotypes concerning aging and disability, the skills required for
effective communication with disabled and elderly persons, medical
and mental health terminology, the effects of medication, and services
available in the community.,,,
VI. CONCLUSION
Courts establish guardianships and conservatorships to make in-
voluntary changes in an impaired individual's life. Guardians now have
control over the lives of substantial numbers of persons, particularly
elderly persons, who retain awareness and capability. The growing
number of impaired elderly persons lends special urgency to this area
of reform, because their remaining capabilities should be recognized
and respected. To deprive them of long-held rights is especially cruel.
In every other type of legal action specifically affecting them, disabled
individuals have claimed recognition of their rights to self-determina-
tion. Because of changes in society and application of guardianship
laws, the traditional relationship between guardian and ward repre-
sents a great injustice and poses the risk of intentional or negligent
abuse. Therefore, guardianship can no longer be managed as a private,
informal matter, as it has been for the past century.
180. The creation and scope of the state-funded public guardian is beyond the scope of this
article. However, many low income, isolated, incompetent individuals have no one capable and
willing to serve as guardians. Florida has acknowledged its interest and responsibility to provide
guardianship assistance by establishing two demonstration public guardian offices, in the second
and fifteenth judicial circuits. See FLA. STAT. §§ 744.702-.709 (1987). The expansion of the
program apparently is limited solely by failure to allocate funds.
181. See National Guardianship Symposium Proceedings, supra note 25 (procedural due
process).
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The specific provisions for a new form of guardianship assistance
have been gathered from other states, which already have adopted
guardianship systems protecting rights of wards. Where reforms are
adopted, they include substantive due process principles that require
the least restrictive alternative form of assistance, procedural due
process throughout the guardianship action, and a system of supervi-
sion that gives meaningful effect to the continuing jurisdiction of the
court. The preferred method of assistance is voluntary services without
adjudication of incompetency and appointment of a guardian. The next
preferable method of assistance is the limited guardianship. Only when
the respondent is without capability is a traditional plenary guardian-
ship imposed. Continuing supervision by the court assures the guar-
dianship will provide quality services with the least possible curtail-
ment of individual autonomy.
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